National conference summarizing the inspection and supervision work in 2022, implementing new tasks in 2023 - Photo: thanhnien.vn

1. New points in the perception of power control in Vietnam

Looking back at history, it can be that seen until the end of the twentieth century, in official documents from the National Party Congresses and legal documents from the State, in speeches as well as articles by the leaders of the Party or the State, the issue of power control is hardly mentioned. It can be explained that, in terms of theoretical knowledge, almost everyone considers every position in the Party and the State apparatuses as an objective assignment, requiring coordination and cooperation among cadres to realize the Party’s goals and ideals of serving the Fatherland and the people.

Moreover, the principle of democratic centralism and unity within the Party is enough to prevent all manifestations of authoritarianism, autocracy, individualism, competition for power and status as well as the exploitation and abuse of position and power for personal purposes.

In practice, the years of struggle for national liberation, national reunification and the first years of national socialist construction under extremely difficult conditions required dedication, sacrifice, political consciousness, and the revolutionary moral qualities of cadres and party members make it rare to see negative phenomena such as abuse of power, and exploitation for personal gain rare.

However, as we delve deeper into the market economy and international integration, more negative phenomena related to the use of power by cadres and party members at all levels increasingly appear in practice, such as intentional violations of the principle of democratic centralism and abuse of power for personal purposes. These not only weaken the effectiveness and efficiency of the leadership and management of the Party and the State apparatuses but also contribute to increasing corruption and waste at all levels and in all places. That situation has angered public opinion, raising the need to study and understand the necessity of power control more clearly and to further perfect power control mechanisms, contributing to building a clean and strong Party, building a socialist law-ruled state and socialist democracy.

Over the past 10 years, the Party’s understanding of power control has made significant progress. The issue of controlling power was officially mentioned in the Document of the 11th National Party Congress (2011), in the speeches by the Party leaders, especially General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. The new points reflecting the Party’s awareness of power control are as follows:

First of all, the awareness of the need and urgency for power control. Simultaneously with the recognition that power is objective and necessary in the life of society, it also acknowledged that power always tends to be corrupted and is the source of many negative phenomena, even crime. History shows that the alienation of power can occur in any socio-political regime, in any state, and in any political party, especially in societies with many legal loopholes. Therefore, there is a need for power control, so those granted power do not exceed their authority, misuse it, or act against the wishes of the entity that delegated it. Power control is even more necessary in a transitioning society, when the market economy develops but the legal institution is not yet complete. There are still many gaps, along with shifts in social and ethical values. Power control is not just about combating corruption and negativity, building political culture, and a culture of governance; it’s an integral part of democracy and the rule-of-law state, protecting human rights and citizens’ rights. One cannot discuss these matters without a mechanism or in the absence of power control.

Next, the understanding of the subjects of power control has expanded from controlling state power to general political power control. This means it’s not only about the power of state agencies and individuals within the state apparatus but also the power of party agencies, individuals within the party apparatus, and the overall political system. This is reflected in the view that General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong has repeatedly affirmed in regard to the inspection, supervision, and enforcement of Party discipline that “there is no forbidden zone, no exception, regardless of the person”. The higher the position and the greater the power one holds, the more control is needed.

The subject of power control has been more broadly recognized, not only from responsible agencies in the Party and the State apparatuses but also from other entities in the political system. This includes the Vietnam Fatherland Front and other socio-political organizations, and even more broadly, the media, communications systems, and directly from the people. Therefore, power control includes control from inside and control from outside the State and political system. Affirming the necessity of power control within the system of State agencies, the Platform for National Construction in the Transitional Period to Socialism (Supplemented and developed in 2011) affirms that “State power is unified; there is assignment, coordination, and control among agencies in the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial powers”. This was affirmed by General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong at the 7th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee (May 2013) on amending the 1992 Constitution: “State power is unified, with assignment, coordination, and control among agencies in the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial powers”.

Regarding power control from the social side, Resolution No. 25 of the 7th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee (June 2013) stated the policy on “to promptly issue and effectively implement regulations on social supervision and criticism of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations, providing regulations for the Fatherland Front, socio-political organizations and the people to contribute ideas on building the Party and building a clean and strong State”.

Power control activities are understood more broadly, more abundantly, corresponding to the position, role, and characteristics of each entity. These activities can be foundational, meaning they occur when power is granted, ensuring power is assigned legally, transparently, to the right person for the right job; granting power goes hand in hand with clearly defined obligations, rights, and responsibilities, and vice versa. After being granted, power continues to be controlled through the Party’s supervision, inspection, and discipline activities or state agencies’ supervision, inspection, prosecution, investigation, and adjudication activities. Power is also controlled by activities of social criticism, social supervision of the Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations, press and media; by monitoring, complaints, and denunciations of the people, etc.

The basis of power control is specified, first of all, based on the Party’s regulations, the State’s laws, and at the same time the ethical standards of party members, civil servants, and public employees. General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong has repeatedly emphasized, along with building ethical standards, the need to “lock power in an institutional cage”, meaning that each position and title must have commensurate regulations on powers, duties, responsibilities and any act of controlling power must be based on those provisions. Even the moral grounds need to be institutionalized into specific regulations on what party members can and cannot do, allowing those with power to self-reflect and adjust their thoughts and actions.

Power control is understood on many levels, from societal criticism about the ethics and lifestyles of powerful individuals to the Party’s disciplinary forms and legal responsibilities in administrative, civil, and criminal matters under State law.

2. New points on the mechanism of power control

With the aforementioned understanding, the power control mechanism has undergone many new changes, reflected in the increasingly complete system of strict regulations of the Party and the State.

Regarding Party institutions: The 11th National Party Congress has amended and supplemented the Party’s Charter, which includes provisions related to the jurisdiction of the Party’s highest leadership bodies. These are essential foundations for the Central Executive Committee, the Politburo, and the Central Inspection Committee to lead, guide, and implement power control within the Party.

In order to strengthen the principle of democratic centralism and prevent negative manifestations related to power, the Central Committees of the 11th, 12th, and 13th Sessions supplemented and perfected the Working Regulations of the Central Executive Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat. These documents clearly and unambiguously assign the scope of responsibilities, working processes of agencies, and members of these agencies. The Central Committee also requires the Party Executive Committees at all levels, after the Congress, to supplement and perfect their working regulations. It is the legal basis within the Party for agencies and individuals to self-regulate their behavior and relationships and is the basis for superior committees to inspect, supervise and enforce discipline for all subordinate committees and committees members and leaders who misuse the power entrusted to them.

The Politburo of the 11th and 12th Sessions revised the Regulation on the organizational structure, functions, and tasks of the agencies under the Central Committee. This also forms a crucial foundation for the Central Committee and the Politburo to lead, direct, supervise, and inspect the activities of agencies, especially the heads of agencies under the Party Central Committee in line with the new context.

Regarding organizational work and cadres, a top priority of the Party that requires power control, the Central Executive Committee of the 12th tenure issued regulations on the standards for cadres at all levels, especially strategic levels such as the Central Committee, the Politburo, the Secretariat. These serve as a foundation for cadre planning and election to committees at all levels, especially strategic levels such as the Central Committee, Politburo, Secretariat, and particularly for the planning and election of the four highest leadership positions of the Party and the State. Alongside the standard regulations, the Central Executive Committee and the Politburo have issued guidelines on the process of planning, electing, and appointing cadres.

Practice over the past 10 years has shown that such regulations and guidelines have limited many arbitrary, subjective, phenomena and intentional evasions in organizational work and cadre affairs. Most recently, the 13th Politburo issued Regulation No. 80-QD/TW dated August 18, 2022, on the decentralization of cadre management and appointment, and the nomination of cadres for election. Accordingly, it further delineates and comprehensively defines the authority of the Politburo, the Central Committee’s Secretariat, and other responsible agencies in appointing and managing senior cadres, even in civil agencies and armed forces. This contributes to better legal construction of power control in the field of organization and cadres.

Similarly, in the field of organization, cadres, inspection, and supervision - which are the areas of operation of the most the Party’s trusted agencies and individuals, the enhancement of power control is also achieved by the Party’s regulation on inspection and supervision issued by the 12^th Central Committee.

In order to build and rectify the Party in terms of morality, and power control from an ethical perspective, the Central Committees of the 11th and 12^th sessions issued Regulations (amended) on what Party members are not allowed to commit, including many things that have been supplemented and updated in line with the new reality. The 12th Politburo also promulgated the Regulation on the responsibilities of leadership by example, applicable to all party members who are leaders of organizations and agencies in the political system, from the central level, down to the grassroots levels. These are specific regulations that are necessary for each party member to control themself and for the superior leadership agencies and other specialized agencies of the Party to supervise, inspect and enforce disciplines.

To contribute to power control from the Vietnam Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations, on December 12, 2013, the 11th Politburo issued Decision No. 217-QD/TW promulgating the “Regulation on supervision monitoring and social criticism of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations” and Decision 218-QD/TW promulgating the “Regulation on comments on Party building of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and other political and social groups”. These are the bases for the Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations at all levels to promote democracy in building the Party and building the socialist rule-of-law State of Vietnam.

In order to strengthen power control through the fight against corruption, the 12th Politburo decided to strengthen the organization and put the Central Steering Committee on anti-corruption and negative actions under the direct leadership and direction of the General Secretary. Currently, this agency has been established in provinces and cities throughout the country, contributing to power control in the political system at all levels.

Regarding State institutions: The 2013 Constitution has made important affirmations, institutionalizing the Party’s views on power control. Article 2 of the Constitution states:

1. The State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a socialist rule-of-law state of the People, by the People, for the People.

2. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is owned by the People; All state power belongs to the People whose foundation is the alliance between the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia.

3. State power is unified, with assignment, coordination, and control among state agencies in the exercise of legislative, executive, and judicial powers.

The above principles of the 2013 Constitution have been expressed more specifically and more closely in the system of legal documents (amended) such as the Law on Organization of the National Assembly, Law on Organization of Government, Law on Organization of the Supreme People’s Procuracy, Law on Organization of the Supreme People’s Court, Law on Organization of Local Government, Decree on organizational structure, functions and tasks of ministries, ministerial-level agencies, and agencies under the Government.

Previously, some regulations were not specific and rigorous, leaving room for those in power to “circumvent the law”, especially in appointing cadres, approving strategies, plans, projects, and so on. For example, the 1992 Constitution stated quite generally that the President “decides on the appointment of ranks and senior officers in the armed forces”. By contrast, the 2013 Constitution specifies that the President “decides on, promotions, demotions, stripping the military ranks of general, rear admiral, vice admiral, navy admiral; appoints, relieves and dismisses the Chief of the General Staff and the Chairman of the General Department of Politics of the Vietnam People’s Army”. This regulation further defines the powers of the State President with the powers of the Prime Minister, the powers of the Minister of National Defense, and the Minister of Public Security in conferring the ranks of officers in the armed forces.

The assignment, coordination, and mutual control are also reflected in many new or revised specialized laws such as the Law on Land, the Law on Planning, the Law on Public Investment, the Law on Enterprises, the Law on Foreign Investment, etc.

Another new point regarding the institutions of power control for state agencies is the introduction of Joint Resolution No. 403/2017/NQLT-UBTVQH14-CP-DCTUBTUMTTQVN on June 15, 2017, between the National Assembly Standing Committee, the Government and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front on coordination in implementing the supervision and social criticism of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations. This is the commitment to cooperation between the competent state authorities and the most representative organization of all classes in society in Vietnam, demonstrating the importance of the Front’s role in power control of the state agency in the appropriate form.

3. New points in the practice of power control

Based on the progress in theoretical understanding and the legal system construction mentioned above, the practical implementation within the Party and state apparatus reveals several new points:

Firstly, the Party’s inspection, supervision, and discipline enforcement has really been promoted from the central to local levels, urgently, seriously, openly, comprehensively, and with focus on key points. The 12th Party Central Committee has established many inspection teams led by Politburo members and members of the Secretariat to conduct thematic inspections in many localities. The conclusions of the sessions of the Central Inspection Committee and the Central Steering Committee on Anti-corruption and negative actions been eagerly anticipated and widely appreciated by society in recent years. This is because many individuals, including members of the Politburo and members of the Central Executive Committee who violated the Party’s charter, regulations, and laws, or displayed shortcomings in their duties and morality, have been inspected and faced severe disciplinary actions. This has had a deterring effect on party committees at all levels and individual leaders.

Secondly, the National Assembly and the National Assembly Standing Committee of the 13th and 14th tenures have strongly strengthened the activities of supreme supervision. Many national guidelines, strategies, and plans, etc., submitted by the Government were discussed by the National Assembly before being approved. The increased authority for the Prime Minister when necessary (for example in dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic) was discussed and promulgated into a resolution by the National Assembly. The question-and-answer sessions during the National Assembly’s meetings with the Government, and during the Standing Committee’s meetings with various departments regarding policies and law enforcement, have become more frequent and in-depth. The supervision by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly in localities, ministries, and branches by topic is carried out more and more carefully and substantively. Such monitoring activities have helped the Government, the Prime Minister, ministers, and government agencies to be more cautious and to properly perform their respective powers and duties.

Thirdly, since the 11th and 12th National Party Congresses, most of the provinces, cities, and districts have unified the titles of Party Committee Secretary and Chairman of the People’s Council. This practice has shown good results. Accordingly, on the basis of the Constitution, the Law on Organization of Local Government, and the Party Charter, the Secretary, who also serves as the Chairman of the People’s Council, possesses extensive authority and means to oversee the chief of the administrative agency, helping to prevent potential misconduct on the part of agencies and heads of local law enforcement agencies.

Fourthly, in inspecting and disciplining cadres, there has been a synchronous and timely combination between political responsibility and legal responsibility, between Party discipline and State discipline. Many high-ranking cadres and civil servants, including current or former deputy ministers, ministers, secretaries, or chairmen of the People’s Committees of provinces and cities who are current or former members of the Party Central Committee after being disciplined by the Party, will be immediately subject to administrative discipline, and if there are signs of legal violations, they may be prosecuted, tried and punished according to the law. On the contrary, a person who, because of his shortcomings or mistakes, bears administrative or criminal responsibility, shall immediately be subject to the corresponding form of discipline by the Party. This synchronicity and timeliness clearly and specifically embodies the principle of the Party leading the construction of the rule-of-law state and promoting democracy in our country, which was highly agreed upon and welcomed by the public.

Practical supervision from society also has a new point since the Joint Resolution between the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, the Government, and the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front came into effect. The supervision and social criticism activities of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and political-social organizations at both central and local levels have become more regular, methodical, qualitative, and effective, playing a significant role in promoting democracy, supervision, and combating corruption and negativity nationwide.

The press and media continue to play a significant role in social supervision and criticism, and are an important tool for the Party, the State, and the people in the realm of power control for all organizations and individuals. In contrast, the press and media are also strictly controlled by the Press Law (amended), the Law on Publication, the Law on Access to Information, the Law on Cybersecurity, by the Press Planning promulgated by the Government in 2019.

4. Some issues raised, requiring continued refinement of the power control mechanism

While there have been significant advances in oversight and control of power in Vietnam recently, there still exist limitations and inadequacies. The 13th National Party Congress assessed: “The mechanism for power control in the Party and the State remains incomplete, lacking synchronization, and its effectiveness is still not high”⁽¹⁾. Alongside this, there is a recent phenomenon in many places where competent cadres and civil servants are hesitant to take action, make decisions, or accept responsibility, particularly evident in delays in disbursing funds, bidding processes, and the pace of project, plan, and socio-economic development program implementation, etc. This has affected the performance of ministries, sectors, and localities. Many people think that the new regulations on power control both within the Party and State have limited the power of those in position of authority, leaving even proactive individuals feeling unsure. Moreover, recently, the discipline of many committees and individuals who violated the principle of democratic centralism in leadership and management has caused many people more cautious, defensive, and “self-preserving”. The Party Central Committee and the Politburo have recognized this situation and issued a policy to develop mechanisms and policies to encourage and protect cadres who dare to think, dare to do, and dare to take responsibility. The Government also directed the Ministry of Home Affairs to concretize this policy in renewing policies for civil servants and public employees.

The above situation highlights the power relationship between the Party and the government, between the Party and society, between the collective and the individual, especially with the heads of the Party committee, and authorities. These relationships need to be institutionalized clearly and specifically, while being understood and executed both strictly and flexibly. They are, after all, manifestations of the pervasive relationship between institutions and people, legal and ethical, that all politics face and need to be addressed in a way that is appropriate to the political culture and reality of the country.

Therefore, to address these relationships smoothly and harmoniously solve this relationship so that it can both promote the role of the collective, promote democracy, and promote the role of the individual leader and manager, we need to continue refining the power oversight and control mechanisms both within and outside the Party, and both within and outside the State and the political system in general. Furthermore, we need to enhance the quality of cadres and Party members in terms of professional level, political qualities, morality, and lifestyle, especially for those at the helm of Party committees.

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Received: June 1, 2023; Revised: June 17, 2023; Approved for publication: June 26, 2023.

Endnotes:

(1) CPV: Documents of the 13th National Party Congress, vol.II, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2021, p.217.

References:

1. Nguyen Dang Dzung: The limitation of state power, Hanoi National University Publishing House, 2005.

2. Trinh Thi Xuyen: State power control - Some theoretical and practical issues in Vietnam, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2008.

3. CPV: Documents of the 11th National Party Congress, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2011.

4. The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2013.